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COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
times embarrassing. We who recognize their responsibilities appreciate
all the more their candor, learning and prudence in giving us their
thoughts on that ever engrossing subject: The Common Law.
EDWIN W. PATTERSON
Columbia University Law School.
THrE LAW OF ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALs-A Collection of Judi-
cial Decisions, Statutes, Administrative Rules and Orders and Other
Materials for Use in Courses on Administrative Law. By E. BLYTHE
STASON. Chicago: CALLAGHAN AND COMPANY, 1937. pp. xxxiv, 757.
Undoubtedly the publication of Professor Stason's volume of ma-
terials is a welcome event to law school teachers of administrative law,
and rightly so. This casebook is the first to enter into the details of
administrative procedure and is the only recent work which deals with
the non-constitutional aspects of administrative law in the American
states. Hence it brings its subject down to the earth which the practic-
ing lawyer is required to till and provides an eminently useful teach-
ing tool for professional purposes. At the same time the quantity,
diversity, and controversial nature of the materials included are such
as to tax the ability of both teacher and student, while the suggestion
in the footnotes and editorial comments of additional problems to be
studied is sufficient to afford a considerable stimulus to independent in-*
vestigation.
The book is usefully divided, into three parts which are devoted,
respectively, to the origin and functions of administrative "tribunals",
the procedure of such tribunals, and judicial relief from administrative
action. The bulk of the space is devoted to appellate decisions, but there
is a generous addition of textual matter drawn from such sources as the
report of the Committee on Ministers' Powers, the reports of the
American Bar Association's Special Committee on Administrative Law,
and the decisions and rules of the Interstate Commerce Commission, as
well as a reproduction of numerous statutes, including the Communica-
tions Act, the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act, and the Federal Register Act, which are given at length, and ex-
cerpts from the Interstate Commerce Act, the Commodities Exchange
Act, the Johnson Act, and various Federal and state statutes governing
administrative procedure and judicial review of administrative deter-
minations. The cases reprinted are strictly modern, with only five ante-
dating 1890 and relatively few going farther back than 1910, and are
confined to the United States. A valuable bibliography is included.
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The table of contents contains detailed sub-headings and an enumera-
tion of the cases and other materials reprinted. Thus it is far more use-
ful than the usual skeleton of topics.
The editor summarizes or introduces various topics by means of
text passages and raises questions in footnotes after the manner of
other recent casebooks. The volume opens with sixteen pages of text dis-
cussing the development of administrative tribunals, the reasons for it,
and the problems engendered. The nature of the functions of such
tribunals is introduced by a classification of those functions drawn
from the report of the Committee on Ministers' Powers. The limita-
tions upon the usefulness of the conceptual classification of functions
are recognized in the text dealing with that question (pp. 81-82). The
importance of administrative discretion is emphasized by the devotion
of a chapter to the limitations upon it.
Professor Stason has not attempted to duplicate the rich mine of
historical and constitutional material which is assembled in the casebook
of Professors Frankfurter and Davison. Some will feel, with the re-
viewer, that an adequate basis for judging the significance and merits of
the development of administrative powers has not been substituted.
The teacher using the book can, of course, supply his own. But it is
arguable, at least, that contemporary economic and political theory and
opinion, if not actual data, would be a desirable antidote in the casebook
itself to the legal theory which is set forth and which yields in the stat-
utes and in many of the cases to factors that are nowhere generalized
with conviction. The editor's recognition (pp. 2-7) of the reasons for
the employment of administrative "tribunals" in government and of the
inevitability of their further use is only by way of very brief sum-
mary. Much more adequate, on the other hand, are the suggestions of
technical competence as a reason for administrative tribunals in cer-
tain fields (pp. 104-129) and the material relating to the inquisitorial
power of such tribunals (c. V).
Despite an evident desire on Professor Stason's part to be scrupu-
lously impartial in presenting the highly controversial issue of the fair-
ness of administrative agencies to affected private interests, it is possi-
ble to argue that at times he has assumed the role of the somewhat
biased objector. He chooses to deal, "for want of a better term", with
administrative "tribunals", defined as "administrative organs which are
implemented with grants of legislative power, or judicial power, or
both of such powers" (p. 4). The word connotes a court or forum that
decides disputes. It has a judicial flavor. Any agency so tagged which
proceeds in a summary manner seems at once to depart from an as-
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sumed norm in a way that demands explanation. Viewed from a dif-
ferent angle, administrative agencies are just that, and they are en-
titled to employ any procedure which will accomplish their purposes
fairly. The tax collector, the health officer, the postmaster, and the
President legislating against the transportation of "hot oil" do not
preside over "tribunals". They are "simply agencies performing the
work of government. The Board of Tax Appeals, of course, is a
tribunal and so are many other administrative bodies. But a neutral
term seems more desirable to characterize administrative agencies as a
whole in a book which deals with all that affect private persons and
property.
Coming to matters of more detail, one finds Professor Stason
specifically asserting (p. 101) that "both good sense and the experience
of the ages indicate the unwisdom of too intimate an alliance between
the prosecution of the case on the one hand and adjudication on the
other." No one would quarrel with this statement, but the assumption
that it applies to administrative agencies in which a separation of func-
tions has not been accomplished is objectionable. Is an agency which
investigates an alleged evil a prosecutor as well as a judge in any true
sense, merely because it has itself initiated the proceeding? Are abuses
especially liable to occur in the course of its investigation? The ques-
tion does not answer itself as many are wont to assume, for even the
scientist begins an investigation with a hypothesis. Hoary maxims do
not answer it. What we need is more information regarding the actual
working of administrative agencies. Gerard Henderson found abuses
in the Federal Trade Commission. The Bureau of Immigration a few
years ago stood convicted of long-continued resort to oppressive tactics
in deportation cases. Other agencies, such as the Interstate Commerce
Commission and the Land Office, have borne study with credit to
themselves. The Committee on Ministers' Powers found nothing to
criticize in England. Whatever chance the law may have for the at-
tainment of scientific accuracy rests upon further careful examination
of legal phenomena, unprejudiced by generalizations which are not
based upon evidence that is pertinent to the matter in hand.
One may rightly take exception, also, to Professor Stason's sum-
mary of the Arlidge case (p. 246), which he prefaces with the statement
that in England the right to notice and hearing "has become decidedly
attentuated in recent years". After outlining the procedure employed,
he asserts that "in short, no semblance of a judicial hearing was af-
forded to the aggrieved Arlidge". This characterization seems hardly
accurate when applied to a proceeding in which the slum-owner was
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given a full opportunity to present his case orally to an inspector and in
writing to the Local Government Board and was denied only the privi-
lege of seeing and meefing the inspector's report and the opportunity
of knowing which official in a responsible office finally approved the
closing order. The statement is made, further, that the case illustrates
"the extent to which administrative law . . . had invaded a common-
law stronghold". Actually, of course, slum clearance is not a common-
law stronghold; for the common law knew nothing of this or most of
the other social functions of the modern state.
One might proceed at great length, detailing the numerous specific
merits of Professor Stason's book and raising a very much smaller
number of objections to this or that point. It should be evident by now,
however, that here is a thorough, up-to-date, useful work for law-
school purposes. One merely hopes that it will not be employed to cul-
tivate in the next generation of American lawyers the naivet6 of a
Hewart and of many, though by no means all, contemporary bar asso-
ciation speakers on administrative law.
RALPH F. FUCHS*
Washington University School of Law.
A HISTORY OF AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT FROM THE CIVIL
WAR TO THE WORLD WAR. By EDwARD R. LEWIs. New York: THE
MACMILLAN Co., 1937. pp. x, 561.
American political thought has been singularly unacademic in
character. The body of it has been developed by practising politicians
engaged in congressional debate, judicial review and campaign con-
troversy. We find few of our professional philosophers in the period
covered by Mr. Lewis' book writing systematic political treatises. Royce,
Peirce, James and Chauncey Wright have left few analyses of the state,
sovereignty or the law.
Mr. Lewis' book is very informative. It presents by means of ex-
tensive quotation a good chronicle of political thought from the Civil
War to the World War. The debates surrounding the passage of the
war amendments, the rise of judicial power in their interpretation, and
the opposition to this power, are treated in chapters I-Ili. Chapters
IV-VI describe the discussions on the nature -of the union, the state,
sovereignty and the law. From here to the end there is a detailed treat-
ment of theories of political action and what Mr. Lewis calls "tests of
political action."
The study suffers from two major defects. (1) It fails to relate
